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The research is a comparative study of the corporate governance 
codes of two countries similar in nature in terms of the time of 
implementation of the corporate governance codes and highly 
differentiated in terms of levels of economic activity. The study is a 
comparison of the corporate governance codes of Indonesia and United 
Arab Emirates. The code was revised and enacted in Indonesia in 2006 
while the code for corporate governance became legal in 2006 for UAE. 
UAE is the country that is marked by very high levels of economic activity 
while Indonesia is a developing nation that is yet to come fully forth to the 
global economic forefront. The study brings forth an analysis of the 
difference in the basic code of corporate governance and also the factors 
that influence and impact the formation of such codes. Through such 
analysis of corporate governance codes, the study aims to highlight the 
positive aspects and also find out the scope for improvement in these 
codes after understanding the relevance and importance of corporate 
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1.1.Research Background  
Corporate governance is a blend of laws, rules and regulations as 
well as voluntary and appropriate practices within the private sector (Aldin 
et al., 2014). Research scholars like Kumar and Sharma (2006) and 
Ammanna, Oesch and Schmid (2011) pointed out that corporate 
governance can be considered as long term business sustainability 
mechanism for companies. Through incorporation of corporate 
governance codes, firms can do business in transparent manner and 
deliver long run economic value for shareholders. In order to implement 
corporate governance codes efficiently, firms need to show mutual and 
equal respect for the society as well as shareholders on the whole (Aldin 
et al., 2014). Sifuna (2012) defined corporate governance as combination 
of law and systematic approaches for monitoring actions of directors and 
board members in order to reduce agency risks. In simple words, 
corporate governance can be conceptualized as set of rules and 
procedures that can help companies to ensure ethical business operation 
and take care of interest of stakeholders. In recent years, emergence of 
financial frauds, corporate scandals, accounting scandals and misdeeds of 
corporate officers in companies like Worldcom, Enron, Lehman Brothers 





sound corporate governace codes for companies (Accounting-degree, 
2014). In the core, corporate governance is being conceptualized as 
hybrid and broad topic that is being charecterized as mix of company laws 
and statutory legislation. Due to mixed nature of corporate governance, 
companies found it perplexing to decide whether to follow company laws 
or statutory legislations. In order to avoid such perplexities, OECD and 
Financial Reporting Councils have taken initiateves to coordinate and 
streamline statutory legislations and company laws into commonly 
understandable codes. Therefore, in order to avoid uncertainities and 
misunderstanding of scopes of corporate governance, companies need to 
follow corporate governance codes to implement corporate governance 
measures (Aldin et al. 2014; Sifuna, 2012).   
Anderson and Gupta (2009) and Tricker (2012) found that various 
research scholars defined corporate governance dimensions in different 
manner. For example, some research scholars perceived good corporate 
governance as transparent disclosures of financial results of the firm while 
other research scholars perceived good corporate governance as equal 
distribution of control rights between the firm and its shareholders.  
Historically, corporate governance norms are being summarized in the 






Therefore, while doing research on corporate governance, 
researchers like Anderson and Gupta (2009) or Aldin et al. (2014) stressed 
on corporate governance codes. In general terms, corporate governance 
codes are important due to 5 reasons, 1- implementation of good 
corporate codes ensure equal participation of shareholders in annual 
general meeting (AGM) irrespective of size of their stake, 2- 
implementation of good corporate governance codes help companies to 
meet interest of shareholders in efficient manner, 3- through 
implementation of robust corporate governance codes, responsibility of 
each board members is being clearly understood, 4- corporate governance 
codes establish environment of ethical behaviour accross the company 
that limits the scope of commiting financial frauds by corporate officers and 
5- good corporate governance codes help companies to present fair image 
among financial investors, due to trust factors, mentioned companies 
would easily convince these financial investors to invest (Ammanna, 
Oesch and Schmid, 2011; Madura, 2012). Due to such benefifits of 
implementation of corporate governance codes, Ammanna, Oesch and 
Schmid (2011) and Nankervis (2005) pointed out that effective corporate 
governance can be achieved through right integration corporate 
governance code.                 
Corporate governance is the way in which company board 





management, supervisors and high levels of authority. The corporate 
governance also makes sure that board members are held accountable for 
affairs of the company. This brings in implications for the company in 
terms of its behavior towards employees, stakeholders, customers, and its 
banks. It has been observed that sound levels of corporate governance 
provide integrity and efficiency that is reflected from financial market 
performance of the company (Madura, 2012). Mallin (2011) and Aldin et al. 
(2014) identified numers of benefits of practicing corporate governance for 
companies such as, 1-increase in access to financial and capital markets, 
2- increasing propensity to survive in competitive business environment 
through merger, joint venture, strategic partnership or reduction of 
business risks through asset diversification, 3- increasing control over 
accounting practices that can improve profit margin, 4- decreasing the 
scope for rise of conflict of interest among owners, 5- reduction of the cost 
of credit by attracting equity investors and 6- minimizing financial and 
business risks help companies to ensure sustainable business growths.         
It is evident from  the above discussion that practising corporate 
governance provides numerous benefits to companies and implementation 
of robust corporate governance codes can help companies to avoid 
financial misconducts. Now, the question is whether same standards of 
corporate corporate governance are being followed by every country 





relatively with change in geographic locations (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; 
Llewellyn, 2008). Surprisingly, Aldin et al. (2014) found that acceptance of 
corporate governance codes or intentions of deploying corporate 
governance codes changes relatively with change in geographic locations. 
In simmilar context, while conducting research on corporate governance 
codes in GCC nations, Aldin et al. (2014) found that acceptance and 
exposure  of corporate governance in countries like United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait. However, Aldin et al. (2014) 
found significant amount variance in corporate governance practices 
across UAE in context to other GCC countries. On the other hand, Caron, 
Fiçici and Richter (2012) compared corporate governance practices in 
developing countries like UAE, Indonesia, India, Brazil and others. The 
scholars found that corporate governance practices in UAE and Indonesia 
share both symmetry and divergence respective to issue regarding 
stakeholder and shareholder interest, roles of managerial bodies and 
others. Due to conjoint presence of symmetry and divergence of corporate 
governance practices in UAE and Indonesia, Caron, Fiçici and Richter 
(2012) found it difficult to compare corporate governance practices in 
these two countries. On the other hand, till date, very few researchers ever 
tried to compare corporate governance practices between UAE and 
Indonesia. Therefore, while comparing corporate governance practices 





(2012) have remained unanswered. As a result, gap in the literature has 
been created. Interesting fact is that both UAE and Indonesia are 
classified as developing countries, therefore, comparing corporate 
governance practices in these two countries will help researchers to 
understand importance and dynamics of corporate governance in 
emerging market. In such context, literature gap regarding corporate 
governance in developing nations will be further increased if researchers 
fail to compare corporate governance (CG) codes in Indonesia and UAE 
(Caron, Fiçici and Richter, 2012). Such gap in the literature has influenced 
this study to shade light on the topic and strengthen the literature 
regarding corporate governance practices in emerging market by 
comparing CG codes in Indonesia and UAE. Corporate governance codes 
of UAE and Indonesia will be compared on the basis of issues regarding 1- 
culture, ownership concentration and law, 2- shareholder & stakeholder 
interest and 3- efficacy of supervisory and managerial bodies. In order to 
develop functional backround of further discussion, corporate governance 
practices in UAE and Indonesia will be briefly discussed in the next 





1.1.1. United Arab Emirates and Indonesia: Corporate Governance 
Practices 
In 2009, Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) of UAE 
introduced new CG codes for listed local companies (Norton Rose 
Fulbright, 2011). Some of the key provisions in corporate governance 
codes are being practices in companies. 33% of directors in companies 
should be independent directors while designation of managing director 
and chairman should be occupied by different individuals. Meetings of the 
board of directors are being occurred at least 6 times annually. On the 
other hand, in order to implement corporate governance codes in robust 
manner, local listed companies in UAE need to form audit committee, 
remuneration committee and nomination committee with at least three 
non-executive directors (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2011). Selection of 
compliance officer and members in audit committee must be evaluated on 
the basis of work experience, financial knowledge and credential of 
candidates. In UAE, listed companies need to follow corporate governance 
compliances while reviewing and publishing financial statements. Listed 
companies need to publish annual reports and financial performance 
statements for both shareholders and stakeholders. It is being mandatory 
for locally listed companies (apart from government agencies) to annual 
report of corporate governance practices to Securities and Commodities 





SCA can impose suspension and financial penalties on the mentioned 
companies (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2011).  
It is evident from the above discussion that SCA has strengthened 
corporate governance practices in UAE through implementation of globally 
accepted standard corporate governance norms (Norton Rose Fulbright, 
2011). As mentioned in the previous section, objective of this study is to 
compare corporate governance codes in UAE and Indonesia. In order to 
explore the topic in comprehensive manner, understanding CG practices 
in Indonesia is needed for this study.  
The government of Indonesia had established its National 
Committee for Corporate Governance in the month of August in 1999 as a 
law under Ministerial Decree through Coordinating Minister of the 
Indonesian economy. This committee comprised about 22 people 
belonging from different sectors including legal, private sector, accounting 
division, public sector and financial sector. This committee got together to 
prepare Code for Good Corporate Governance in 2001 and since then, the 
document has served as a benchmark for referring to practices of sound 
corporate governance in Indonesian business sector. 
The code for corporate governance in Indonesia has been 
formulated to serve the purpose of providing flexible standards in order to 





of providing mandated regulations. It was expected that public companies 
as well as state owned corporations and companies that utilized public 
money for their operations were required to implement the code on an 
immediate basis; whereas, private companies were allowed time for 
implementation of these codes within their systems (Caron, Fiçici and 
Richter, 2012; Bruno, 2007). On the basis of above discussion, following 
research questions are being developed in order to address the research 
problem in holistic manner.  
1.2.Research Questions 
The primary issue that is associated with corporate governance is 
striking a balance between the insiders and the decision taken through 
managerial discussion.  The research aims at analyzing the corporate 
governance codes in UAE and Indonesia. The research questions 
pertaining to this report shall be answered through a comparative study of 
the corporate governance codes for two countries.  
1. What are the differences and similarities between the codes of 
corporate governance between Indonesia and UAE? 
2. What is the degree of effectiveness attained through 






For mesuring effectiveness of code of conduct in UAE and Indonesia; 
factors like voting rights, remuneration approval, director appointment, 
cultures and shareholder as well stakeholder interest fullfillment will be 
used. Aldin et al (2014) and Caron, Fiçici and Richter (2012) used 
mentioned factors while comparing effectiveness of corporate governance 
in different countries. Mentioned factors will be judged in non-numeric as 
well as qualitative manner with the help of secondary data sources such 
as academic peer reviewed journals, books, company annual reports, 

















Corporate governance codes were first developed by Cadbury 
Committee in 1992 (Cambridge Judge Business School, 2014). It was an 
attempt towards formalizing and codifying best practice codes for making 
them implicit and explicit within the largest UK companies. The report was 
formulated as a reform measure after events that followed the Black 
Monday. In 1987, US financial markets suffered a blow by about quarter of 
its value and entailed a series of economic downturns and distrust in 
businesses. The corporate governance codes were aimed to focus on 
three primary issues which are; 
1. Duties Board of Directors 
2. Responsibilities of Institutional investors  
3. Auditing and Accountability 
There is a need for constant monitoring and evaluation of board of 
directors. This called for a split in roles of the chairman and the CEO as an 
independent party. Soloman (2010) stressed on ownership concentration 
and law issue of corporate governance. According to Soloman (2010),  
chairman and the director should be separate individuals for companies 





executive and independent in nature. On the other hand, corporate 
governance codes are being guided by legal provisions and legal norms 
being mentioned by supervising authority of different countries.   As par 
revised corporate governance codes of UK, board members need to 
conduct certain numbers of annual meeting in order to address concerns 
of shareholders and decide company policies (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2012).  
Also, institutional investors who had more than 5% stake in the 
company were to be regarded as major shareholders (Soloman, 2010). 
There was a requirement of a higher degree of dialogue between 
shareholders and directors of the company to establish higher levels of 
understanding and dialogue, thereby appreciating needs of stakeholders. 
The auditing and accountability was to secure transparency in operations 
and accountability in company actions. They were to facilitate a higher 
degree of communication and assure a proper disclosure made by the 
company for the interests of shareholders and potential investors 
(Ehrhardt and Brigham, 2010).  
Following this, there have been many other countries who have 
introduced their own corporate governance codes for countries, which are 
largely applicable for big corporations listed within their jurisdictions. Of 





Cooperation and Development) and the ICGN (International Corporate 
Governance Network). 
The need for effective corporate governance can be witnessed in wake 
of the financial crisis, which was nothing but a failure of management 
within companies due to lack of sound practices of corporate governance. 
It can be easily said that failure of management is the failure of sound 
governance (Davies and Green, 2008; Pagano, Röell and Zechnhner, 
2001). The need for corporate governance codes was imperative in the 
context of financial markets; however, need for providing solutions to 
ineffective governance is universal (Hoflich, 2011).  
OECD had been established in 1961 as an international organization 
comprising countries that operated under the market economy as well as 
encompassing certain developing nations. The OECD was also to support 
a forum where policies were coordinated and established. In 2004, the 
OECD was updated to provide a regime for high degree of corporate 
governance (Brennan and Solomon, 2008). This attempt was a first of its 
kind in an intergovernmental organization. The principles of OECD are 
aimed at guiding OECD as well as non-OECD nations towards evaluating 
and improving regulatory and institutional framework for sound corporate 
governance within their geographic boundaries, besides providing 
sufficient assistance for investors, stock exchanges, corporate and 





corporate governance (Brennan and Solomon, 2008). The primary 
principal was to provide a functional and non-functional oversight to 
companies that were publicly traded. Such tools were universal and could 
be similarly applied to companies that were not traded on public platform 
(OECD, 2011; Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Großfeld and Luttermann, 
2012). 
The primary objectives of the principals of corporate governance are 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Brennan and Solomon, 2008);  
1. Providing a sound basis for efficient corporate governance codes 
2. Detailing on rights of the shareholders and their main ownership 
functions 
3. Ensuring an equitable treatment for all the shareholders 
4. Highlighting the roles of stakeholders in company corporate 
governance 
5. Laying down responsibilities and disclosure as well as transparency 
norms for the board. 
2.1.1.Importance of Corporate Governance Codes 
It has been highlighted and reinstated that ultimate goal of sound 
corporate governance is to make sure that the organization is functioning 





importance of sound corporate governance rests in the fact that high 
degrees of corporate governance is the key to attract big investments as 
well as stimulate growth of the economy in a country that has a good 
practice in place.  
The corporate governance codes might have different 
representations in different countries, but the prime motive for all codes is 
the same; that is protection of investor’s rights and stakeholders interests 
allowing for higher degree of accountability, transparency and 
responsibility on part of companies that are engaged in the markets. The 
prime differences arise only in the context of dissimilarities in cultures of 
different nations (EASD and ACGN, 2002). 
Importance of need of implementing corporate governance codes 
have been already mentioned in the introduction section. Need for 
corporate governance codes being directed range of benefits that can be 
achieved by implementing it. Benefit 1- implementing corporate 
governance codes would decrease scope of conducting financial 
malpractices and accounting fraud by corporate officers of the company 
(Armstrong, 2006; Callioni, 2008). Benefit 2- implementation of good 
corporate codes would erradicate the barrier of participation of small level 
shareholders in annual general meeting (AGM), as a result, confidence of 
shareholders gets increased (Aldin et al., 2014). Benefit 3- 





develop strong relationbship with investors by fullfilling their interest. As a 
result, it becomes easier to access investment from the mentioned 
investors (Anderson and Gupta, 2009; Keasey, Thompson and Wright, 
2005). Benefit 4- implementation of corporate governance codes increase 
internal control of companies over its accounting practices and financial 
reporting, as a result, profit earning opportunity gets increased (Madura, 
2012; Calder, 2008). Due to such unique benefits of corporate governance 
codes implementation, companies feel the need of having good corporate 
governance that can drive sustainable business growth.  
According to report published by Financial Reporting Council 
(2012), corporate governance codes are designed in order to address all 
the five key parameters such as leadership, effectiveness of runing board 
operations, accountability of financial issues and action of boards, , 
remuneration of board members and managing stakeholder relationship. 
In the recent UK corporate governance codes being revised in 2012, these 
five parameters are being used to develop robust framefork for corporate 
governance practices.  
Directives for leadership is being defined as “every company should 
be headed by an effective board which is collectively responsible for the 
long-term success of the company (Financial Reporting Council., 2012, p. 
8). Therfore, developing a strong board structure is primary requirement 





unfettered powers of decision, no person is allowed to hand dual 
responsibility CEO and board president simultaneously. As part of CG 
codes, companies need to evaluate qualification of board members in 
terms subject knowledge, work experience and industry credentials. 
According to corporate governance codes, companies need to establish 
separate audit, nomination and remuneration committee in order to 
monitor remuneration of directors, nominate board members and monitor 
accounting practices (Financial Reporting Council, 2012). Corporate 
governance codes suggest that Executive Management and Audit 
Committee of companies need to evaluate accounting and financial 
reporting practices of companies in periodic manner. Corporate 
governance codes also encouge transparent disclosure of financial results 
to shareholders, addressing requirements of internal and external 
stakeholders and participation of shareholders in AGM. In the recent UK 
corporate governance codes being revised in 2012, provision for 
remuneration of board directors is being defined as “levels of remuneration 
should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality 
required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid 
paying more than is necessary for this purpose” (Financial Reporting 
Council., 2012, p. 21). Therfore, it can be said that incorporation of 
mentioned parameters in corporate governance codes has increased its 





Großfeld and Luttermann (2012) identified some of the key corporate 
governance codes that are being needed to follow by companies such as 
OECD Model, UK corporate governance codes of 2012, Combined Code 
of UK and Sarbanes-Oxley act of the USA. These four corporate 
governance codes are being widely followed by companies across the 
globe. Institutes like OECD, Financial Reporting Council are United States 
Congress are the main institutes that release these codes. In UK based 
corporate governance codes, issues regarding leadership, effectiveness of 
runing board operations, accountability of financial issues and action of 
boards, , remuneration of board members and managing stakeholder 
relationship are being addressed. In Sarbanes–Oxley act,  issues 
regarding auditing, financial reporting, regulation of corporate reporting are 
being discussed. In OECD principles, streess is given on protection of 
interest of shareholders. By complying these CG codes, companies 
develop strong relationship with shareholders and get easy access to 
capital market (Großfeld and Luttermann, 2012; FRC, 2011). Major 
impediments for complying with these codes are,  1- no specific codes for 
small level companies, 2- complex and resource hungry requirements for 
meeting CG compliances for small level firms and 3- non availability of 
codes that provide equal importance on all the parameters of corporate 





2.1.2.Effectiveness of CG Codes 
Brennan and Solomon (2008) reflected that quality of corporate 
governance was increasingly being considered by investors as well as 
companies, in addition to company financial performance, for making 
investment choices in favor of the company. Corporate governance brings 
forth a system for structuring, controlling and operating procedures of a 
company with a view to gain long-term strategic goals for satisfaction of 
shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers and creditors. This also calls 
for compliance on the regulatory and legal conditions, social and 
environmental considerations and meeting needs of the local community 
wherein the company operates. In the past decade, after the dot com 
boom and collapse of Enron and Worldcom, role of the corporate 
governance regime has been given greater attention (Davies, 2006). The 
drawbacks associated with it might include lack of independence in 
decision making for the board, restriction on shareholding interest for 
institutional investors and excessive involvement of related parties in 
company affairs; yet, corporate governance is regarded as important for 
company’s sustainability development and protection of investor and 
shareholders’ interests. 
In the case of United States, the topic for corporate governance has 
quite a contrast with the norm that is set in most nations. The existence of 





manages and runs a separate body for the implementation of corporate 
governance in the country. The Sarbanes Oxley act of 2002 was the 
attempt towards such a government rule (Hansen, 2011). 
The Act of 2002 was initiated in an attempt to address the issue of 
widespread failure of corporations including WorldCom and Enron that 
showed that there was a great lack in the corporate governance. The 
Sarbanes Oxley Act is believed to be one of the most extensive and critical 
set of regulations that have been passed by Congress in USA since 1934 
(Murphy and Topyan, 2005).  The provisions of the Sarbanes Oxley act 
has laid its focus of different aspects of corporate governance that 
includes the need for CEO or CFO certification for corporate governance, 
the empowerment of the independence of the auditor and also the internal 
audit team, formation of the external body of regulators for managing the 
auditors which is known as the PCAOB or the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (Mallin, 2010). 
It is still a debatable issue whether the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) 
was as effective as desired. It has become quite rampant that the SOX 
have only increased the indistinctness and confusion associated with the 
judicial interpretations and thus not being accepted well within the courts. 
The SOX might have been able to give some strength to what were 
deemed to be the best practices in doing business but they have changed 





responsibilities of the board, the responsibility of the director and reduce 
the scope for misconduct for companies. The Act has changed the culture 
of corporations where collegiality dominated over the best interests of the 
shareholders in board decisions. The Sarbanes Oxley Act needs some 
improvisations in order to serve the complete purpose of effectiveness in 
corporate governance (Edwards, 2003). 
The Asian Financial crisis spurred the need for corporate 
governance in Asia with the exposure of weaknesses within policies and 
institutions. There were a series of reforms and Asia committees and the 
OECD have been making constant attempt towards supporting this drive 
to improve the situation of corporate governance within the continent 
(OECD, 2011). The Asian Roundtable conducts regular reviews and 
updates of corporate governance implementation and success of 
participating nations (Classens and Fan, 2002). The reviews presented 
have shown that companies which came under the purview of the 
roundtable had updated their laws and guidelines that fell in line with the 
corporate governance codes set by the organization. Such regulations 
have also seen a convenient relaxation in a planned manner by some 
nations like Hong Kong and China which presents that the regulation has 
not seen quite an effective implementation. This was done in an attempt to 
reduce the burden of conflict of interests within the corporate governance 





accounting principles from GAAP to IFRS (Asian Roundtable for Corporate 
Governance, 2014). 
In a Corporate Governance watch report by the Asian Corporate 
Governance Reports, the ranking of various nations on the degree of 
corporate governance attained has been enlisted. The list ranks Singapore 
at the top while brings Philippines at the bottom. Indonesia ranks second 
last in terms of corporate governance (Bruno, 2007). Thailand was 
designated with the title of having the highest improvement levels in 
corporate governance while India fell remarkably within the rankings 
(ACGA, 2014).  
A review of corporate governance mechanisms in Australia 
depicted that the independence of board of directors in decision making 
was viewed to be the key within corporate governance codes in the 
country. Another important feature is the board effectiveness in smooth 
implementation of corporate governance in Australia. This effectiveness is 
pertaining to the educations levels, the skills and the knowledge of the 
board members who run the company such that they are capable enough 
to carry out their roles (Rao, Tilt and Lester, 2012). It was also observed 
that there is a huge lack of power at the hands of Australian shareholders. 
This is a result of weak regulations and lack of law that protects the 
interests of the shareholders (Lim, 2010). The Australian code for 





not for a remuneration committee. However, the code does set out a policy 
that encompasses the remuneration system for the key executives of the 
company. The reflection of company’s trading policy and code of conducts 
provides much transparency in company operations but there is no rule for 
reflecting upon the future business plans for the interest of the 
shareholding community. The code provides requirement for separation of 
the chairperson and the directors. There is also a provision for presence of 
independent directors. However, the code wants a majority of independent 
directors rather than company owned directors. Hence provisions of the 
code of corporate governance for Australia are not in line with the code of 
Western nations (FIRB, 2014). 
Corporate Governance is related to those institutions that have an 
impact on corporate resource allocations and also the rates of return. The 
process of globalization has not only initiated but also hastened the 
pressure on nations to converge towards a global benchmark for corporate 
governance. Te global integration of the financial markets ahs brought 
forth an enhanced speed of corporate governance integration with the 
global systems. Those who advocate globalization process state that such 
integration shall allow for better ways and efficient modes of capital 
allocations. When examples are drawn from nations that have had a 
recent and significant impact of global financial crisis, the need for having 





Increase in awareness of corporate governance practices among the 
investors has also begun determining the investment climate and 
sustenance of companies. Reports have indicated that over 50% of the 
European investors and almost 61% of the US investors have refrained 
from investing in companies that display poor corporate governance 
mechanisms and practices (Gregory, 2000).  
The demand for investment capital is on the rise across both 
developed and developing nations. The government for both these types 
of nations has reduced their share of aids in such corporation. Hence in 
need for additional capital, companies have started to realize the 
importance of good and sound corporate governance practices. This has 
become more evident with the fall in the barriers that hindered free flow of 
capital between nations. Hence one can conclude that the quality of 
corporate governance practice is important for capital formation and also 
that weak corporate governance combines cronyism and corruption 
(Waring, 2006). While measuring effectiveness of corporate governance, 
Großfeld and Luttermann (2012) and Mallin (2010) used indicators like 
board size, board leadership, board independence, ownership structure, 
institutional investors etc. Based on availability of data, such factors will be 
incorporated while measuring effectivenesas of CG in UAE and Indosenia. 
However, these intermediate micro factors will discussed under major 
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The theoretical background serves as a premise for the 
development of relevance and importance of corporate governance code 
within the general context of all nations. The theory builds the basis on 
which the code for corporate governance was developed.  
Secondary data sources like online articles, books and academic 
peer reviewed journals regarding corporate governance will be accessed 
for developing theoretical background of the research problem. For 
example, research works of Aldin et al (2014) and Caron, Fiçici and 
Richter (2012) will be accessed to understand cross country dynamics of 
corporate governance.    
The research shall make extensive use of qualitative research to 
conduct this study. Qualitative research methods are often considered as 
more descriptive part of a scientific research methodology and as per 
opinions stated by academic scholars, qualitative research discipline 
promises to offer a more comprehensive study of the research problem 
compared to quantitative research study.  
The study has chosen the particular research strategy after careful 
consideration and observation of multiple exogenous factors like, 





the research and type of findings desired by the report. Research strategy 
was formulated so as to carry out data collection and collaboration from 
available sources of data samples. This data collected was then converted 
into information that is relevant and appropriate for the use of this study in 
an accurate and an unbiased manner. 
The research strategy should ideally have two main types of functionalities 
1. Identification of structural framework conducive to the research and 
formulation of the process map that shall help in carrying out the 
specific research. 
2. Verification of data source authenticity so as to make sure that the 
research report is of high quality. 
Academicians have advocated that a research strategy should 
ideally be framed in a logical pattern that shall address each of the 
research objectives. The structural framework for the particular 
research study can be presented as below: 
 Alignment of research objectives with the specific research 
problem. 
 Determination of research data set, selected studies and 





 Determination of costs and time schedule associated with the 
research report. 
 Summarizing the data in a systematic and methodical manner 
 Analyzing data in a qualitative manner and converting the same 
into valuable information relevant for the study. 
 Verification of research results with the research question. 
3.1.1.Research Approach and Characteristics of the Study 
The paper desires to test reliability of the assumption by firstly 
analyzing theory and then going about validating assumptions within the 
research paper. This is known as the inductive research pattern. Here, 
research paper analysis behavior and patterns help to arrive at definitive 
conclusions for questions that were initially set within the research 
paper.The qualitative study shall foreground behavior patterns, expert 
opinions and also subjective aspects within the scope of study in this 
research; this cannot be attained through the objective nature of a 
quantitative study. This study has chosen qualitative analysis for studying 
the code of corporate governance in UAE and Indonesia for the purpose of 
drawing comparison between codes of the two countries. A quantitative 
study fails to examine and represent the codes of corporate governance in 
a thorough manner. The inductive approach of the research paper is 





research scholars with a view to avoid any deviations from the research 
objectives and discuss key points within the literature review. 
The primary focus of this research is to establish some sort of 
connection between the codes of corporate governance between UAE and 
Indonesia and also studying the degree to which such codes have been 
successfully implemented and reflected within the market sentiments of 
these nations. 
The research has taken up the qualitative study approach so as to 
take a full measure of the exogenous variable and benefit from 
encompassing the different approaches of study presented within the 
















4.1.1.1Culture, Ownership concentration and Law 
4.1.1.1.1.Culture 
UAE operates a separate corporate governance code for its large 
and medium corporations, its central banking concerns and its government 
owned entities. The Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) operates 
and lays down rules of corporate governance for all listed companies. For 
the purpose of corporate governance within government owned entities, 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi has established Resolution 17 in 2010. The central 
banks have to adhere to a binding and a non-binding set of rules for 
corporate governance, which is set within the institutions. They function 
under a separate Corporate Governance Guidelines for Banks with 
considerable commonality in themes as per corporate governance code 
set out by the SCA. 
Indonesia has a very unique system of business with a clear 
separation of duties of the board of directors and that of commissioners. 
The Dewan Komisaries is completely responsible for actions and activities 





good corporate governance within the company. The members of this 
team are required to act as independently as possible and work in best 
interests for their respective organization. .  
 
4.1.1.1.2.Ownership concentration 
According to corporate governance codes in UAE, individuals are 
not allowed to perform dual roles of director and the chairman 
simultaneosly. 1/3 of board members should be independent in nature 
while existence of non-executive directors in the board is being prefered. 
On the other hand, 20% of the board members of the Direksi have to be 
independent for the purpose of increasing transparency and effectiveness 
of management. Furthermore, the Dewan Komisaris is to have 20% of 
their ownership in the hands of independent parties (ECGI, 2001).  
4.1.1.1.3.Law 
The law that governs the code for corporate governance in 
Indonesia was established in 1999 by the Minister of Economy under a 
Ministerial Decree; whereas, the law governing codes of corporate 







In Indonesian code of conduct, meeting of the supervisory 
committee or the Dewan Komisaris members should be held once in every 
month and the Direksi shall be entitled to read minutes of the meeting; 
whereas in case of UAE, meeting of the shareholders needs to be 
conducted once in every two months. 
The similarity of both meetings is that such meetings shall be held 
for the purpose of decision makiung regarding to business activities and 
have to be in confirmity with the interests of the shareholders. 
4.1.1.3.Stakeholder and shareholder interests 
4.1.1.3.1.Interest of society and stakeholders 
The purpose of corporate governance codes in Indonesian context 
is to ensure value maximization for shareholders through transparency, 
responsibility, reliability, fairness and accountability. The codes aim to 
encourage company’s management to optimize the use of Direksi and 
Dewan Komisaris. It also aspires to motivate members of these bodies to 
act and take decisions with a sense of morality and in compliance with set 
rules and laws. 
In UAE, the purpose of corporate governance codes is issued by 
the Securities and Commodities Authority and applies to all institutions and 





government owned concerns, foreign companies or central bank regulated 
concerns. The codes are aimed at providing high levels of controls and 
assessment mechanisms for company’s management and require 
maintenance of shareholders and stakeholders interests (Celik and Amico, 
2011; Mubarak, 2011). 
4.1.1.3.2.Interest of shareholders 
Disclosures 
Disclosure and transparency norms in the context of UAE are 
stringent. Accounting standards that are followed are as per the IFRS and 
the GAAP norms. UAE companies are legally required to publish 
consolidated financial statements. Along with this, companies also need to 
publish non-financial disclosures like, corporate governance practices and 
their structures, qualification and experience of directors, remuneration 
scales for directors and other top executives, statements on any deviations 
from the standards of corporate governance structure prevalent within the 
country, ownership structure of the management, foreseen risk factors as 
well as a statement for the management discussion and its analysis. The 
disclosures, however, do not provide for any information on forward 
looking plans of the company.  
In Indonesian context, all material information is to be disclosed 





information, company short-term and long-term goals, objectives and 
business strategies, working status of major shareholders, audit evaluation 
reports from external audit teams, details of members who form the 
Dewan Komisaris and the Direksi, remuneration of key company officials 
and the system of corporate governance prevalent within the company. 
Disclosures pertaining to director remuneration and for all major 
business decisions to the shareholder is common to both nations.  
Rights of shareholders 
The stakeholder’s contract in line with the prevailing law shall be 
honored by the company as per Indonesia’s code for corporate 
governance. Furthermore, any infringement of shareholder’s rights shall be 
compensated in an appropriate manner (Gregory, 2002). 
In principal, shareholders are to have opportunity for monitoring 
activities and offering input to the Direksi of the company. The company 
here is liable to provide all necessary information to its shareholders with a 
view to protect their rights. Cooperation is imperative between the 
shareholders and the company for shared benefits.  
The rights of each shareholder are to be protected and each of them is 
free to exercise his right in congruence with procedures that have been 





1. The right to attend any general meeting of the shareholders and to 
exercise voting rights in the ratio of one shares one vote. 
2. The right of acquiring relevant corporate information in a regular 
and timely manner for the purpose of making informed investment 
decisions. 
3. The right to get a share of distributable profits of the company in 
proportion with their shareholding as distributions and dividends. 
In case of UAE, shareholders have access to annual and semi-annual 
reports of the company, irrespective of size of their holding (Red Flag 
Group, 2013). UAE based shareholders have the right as well as 
opportunity to vote on distribution of profits. This provides them with 
sufficient disclosures pertaining to profit sums and decision making 
regarding use of these amounts. Distribution of profits is to be made within 
30 days of agreement over the share of distributable profits. 
Equitable treatment 
In Indonesia, shares of the same kind shall be held equally within 
the company, which brings in the principal of equity among shareholders 
holding similar kinds of shares. Shareholders are, hence, allowed to vote 
in accordance with the number of shares and type of shares held. Each 
shareholder has an equal right to access complete and accurate 





reason for non-provision of the same. The company has no right to be 
partial to any segment of shareholders over others, under any conditions. 
The shareholders or members of Dewan Komisaris or the Direksi are not 
allowed to engage in insider trading practices. 
In UAE, shareholders enjoy equitable rights in shareholding, 
information sourcing and voting for company affairs; and any violation of 
such basic shareholders rights can generate direct and individual action. 
Such violation can also initiate an action by a specific class of 
shareholding community. Irrespective of size of holdings, even a minority 
shareholder can demand for an inspection of records and books of the 
company. Insider trading is treated as an offence and the country has 
legal actions that allow for huge penalties and imprisonment for violation of 
the same. 
4.1.1.4.Supervisory and managerial bodies 
Committees 
Indonesian supervisory body is the Dewan Komisaris and 
managerial body is the Direksi. In UAE, there is no such separation of 
supervisory and management roles observed. Both Indonesia and UAE 
have separate remuneration committee, nomination committee and audit 





In Indonesia, each of these committees has a representative from 
the Dewan Komisaris and Direksi and these representatives fall within the 
category of independent directors. The remuneration committee has to 
provide for the company’s remuneration system, stock option grants, 
compensation and redundancy schemes and pension rights. The 
nomination committee attends to the criteria of selecting officials for high 
executive positions within the company and formulating a system for 
making recommendations and assessments for the board. The audit 
committee frames an adequate structure for internal controls, improves 
financial disclosures and reviews the scope and independence of external 
audits. 
In UAE, there are representatives from the board within the 
committees in form of at least two independent directors. There is no 
restriction on the number of directors who can represent within the 
independent committees. Even so, in case of the audit committee, majority 
of board participation shall include independent directors. The committees 
shall necessarily have three non-executive directors, where two of them 
should be independent. Within the audit committee, it is essential to have 
a financial and accounting expert. 
The similarity between the UAE and Indonesia Corporate 





review the manner and scope fo remuneration for the directors and also 
have a system for reporting these within their public platforms. 
4.1.2.Effectiveness 
Indonesia 
In the last few years, global stock indices have performed 
disastrously. Nonetheless, one such exception was Indonesia, where 
stock exchanges performed otherwise. The dismal global scenario was 
amplified by the European Debt Crisis. The Jakarta Stock Exchange had 
recorded a nearly 5% growth in 2011 when the Global Index had fallen by 
10% and the Asia Pacific Index had slumped by approximately 18% 
(OECD, 2012). 
At the same time, Indonesia was experiencing a financial boom, 
which might not have been reflected in dividend yields, but was definitely 
present within investor sentiments. The stock market in Indonesia was 
operating with high investor confidence, thereby turning highly resilient 
towards international turbulence in the financial markets. In addition to this, 
business sector of the country was getting highly organized and was 
swiftly implementing the code for corporate governance. Such reflection of 
sound corporate governance came through the investment grade 





The degree of fairness in accounting practices along with 
transparency, responsibility and accountability had been established after 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The guidelines are set by the National 
Committee of Governance, operating since 2001. Corporate governance is 
being implemented in a two pronged approach; the first being the rules 
based way, whereas the second is ethics based approach.  
The rules based way is primarily driven by regulations of the 
government, while the ethics based approach came through as a result of 
greater consciousness towards sustainable long-term business 
relationships and profit making.  
Over the years, acceptance and implementation of corporate 
governance codes among blue chip companies has been rising from 53% 
of the companies in 2006 to 83% of the same in 2009. The relationship 
can be seen in the chart below. 
Figure 1: Indonesian market performance against Asian Stock 






(Source: Yap, 2012) 
Good corporate governance makes it easier for companies to raise 
capital from equity, debt and foreign sources as well. This also renders 
financing cheaper, which leads to low cost of capital. The above chart 
represents a clear link between implementation of the revised corporate 
governance code and rise in Indonesian stock exchange prices. The gap 
has been widening since adoption of the new code for corporate 
governance; this was temporarily interrupted by the Lehman Brothers 
collapse. It is worth noting that rise in the IDX was witnessed from 2006, 
the year in which the revised codes were presented. 
Figure 2: Positive correlation between corporate governance 






(Source: Yap, 2012) 
The above chart is a reflection of the positive correlation between 
Jakarta Exchange listed companies that have incorporated corporate 
governance and their P/E ratios between 2006 and 2010. The relationship 
is highly evident in emerging nations, where sentiment of the investor 
bears high correlation with stock performance. Good corporate 
governance facilitates positive image of the company, while bad 
governance leads to dumping of the stock. 
United Arab Emirates  
UAE had started to focus their attention towards effective and 





introduced Corporate Governance Regulations for listed companies in 
April 2007. The comprehensive code had come about in 2010 (Perrin and 
Bainbridge, 2011). The practice of corporate governance is still believed to 
be in its nascent stages in the country. The country holds immense 
strength in the family business structure and this has highly impacted 
effective implementation of corporate governance regimes within 
companies (Hassan and Halbouni, 2013).  
The culture of UAE is the greatest barrier in effectual corporate 
governance implementation within companies. The shareholders are 
considered to be financial investors, rather than owners of the company. 
Their interests have been limited to short-term affairs of the company 
(SQU, 2007). The corporate governance codes do not provide for 
mandatory information disclosure about company’s long-term 
perspectives. On the flip side, shareholders are naive and handicapped in 
terms of discharging shareholding rights. Infringement of shareholders 
rights has implications for offence only on paper and not in practicality. 
Voting rights, remuneration approval, director appointment and such other 
professional rights are not always obliged (Hassan, 2012). There have 
also been incidences of hidden shareholding block where it becomes 
difficult to determine the exact relationship shared by them with the 





raise the scope for insider trading and lack in detection and monitoring 
mechanism (Aljifri and Moustafa, 2007). 
The law implementation and enforcement is very weak pertaining to 
the corporate governance regime. The regulators are finding it difficult to 
obtain relevant resources and this includes compliance with rules and 
regulations of the corporate governance code. The management of 
corporate within UAE is also very weak. The companies had been 
managed by family and kin. The concept of a management and of 
presence of independent and non-executive directors is very new; and 
culture of the country is finding it difficult to implement the same within the 
nation. The culture calls for high interdependency and interconnectedness 
in business deals and corporate affairs. There is still time for complete and 
effective implementation of corporate governance codes in UAE so as to 













In terms of differences in cultures, the UAE governance has a 
separate set of rules meant for central banking companies, government 
corporations and large corporations that are privately held. This brings in 
some ambiguity in the differences in the codes for government owned 
entities. Strict norms might have been aligned for private institutions but 
state owned companies appear to be under high control of the government 
displaying less transparency in operations. In the context of central banks, 
such transparency is highly desired and hence there is a need to align the 
corporate governance codes for private institutions along with the central 
banking code. 
The Indonesian culture has separation of the management board 
and the supervisory board where the Dewan Komisaris has the power to 
influence the decisions for the Direksi. The chairman and the directors are 
present within the Direksi and hence there is a need to state their rights in 
a more lucid manner for ensuring their independence. 
In terms of representation and disclosure requirements, the UAE 
governance does not provide for any future looking policies corporate 
governance. This does not give a clear picture of the way in which the 





can be huge and such can be sought either from the debt sources or 
through equity allocations. Hence without knowing the reason behind the 
sourcing of such funds and also the manner of its utilization, it is difficult to 
predict the best practices within companies. In the Indonesian context, the 
corporate governance code practices and structures do not have any 
mandatory representation in the disclosure requirements. This is a 
deterrent for companies who cannot benefit from the positive impacts of 
reflection of corporate governance codes of a company like ease in 
sourcing of funds, good company image and brand building. 
The use of proxies in the voting system in UAE allows for sufficient 
gap in voting process for making biased choices of representatives for 
executive committee members in order to make large business decisions 
and strategic action. This loophole can be easily capitalized upon by 
parties who want to alter the shareholding in favor of their decision. There 
is a need for an overseeing committee, which enables proper oversight of 
usage of such proxy voting systems and manages flow of proxies, such 
that votes do not get filtered in favor of desired decision of the company. 
Shareholder’s rights to decide over distribution share of profits bring 
in sufficient transparency in use of shareholders money in UAE; however, 
this also entails dilution of interests of the board regarding use of such 





purposes, while the shareholders might decide over distribution. Such 
conflicts become difficult to manage. 
The report findings suggest that UAE needs to be stricter with 
representation of directors as well as independent directors within the 
independent remuneration, audit and nomination committee. This is 
necessary in order to establish greater transparency in remuneration 
patterns of the top level executives, the ownership concentration of 
management committees and transparency in the nomination processes, 
such that relation biases are absent in case of family held businesses and 
greater lucidity is present in audit processes.  
Indonesia makes a general statement regarding penalties for 
insider trading practices and allows for only disclosers to concerned 
authorities in the event of discovery of insider trading practices. UAE has 
strict laws and specified penalties for insider trading like, fine up to 
100,000 Dhirams and imprisonment from 3 months to 3 years. This implies 
that penalties for insider trading are not very strict in Indonesia and need 
to be checked. Heavy penalties in corporate governance codes enable 
higher levels of compliance and adherence to desired practices. 
The absence of a separate board and supervisory committee in 
UAE has given significant decision making power to the management 





decision making that provides pure reflection of the strength of the key 
shareholders within UAE companies. Such board has high membership of 
family members who are the key personnel running the business in UAE. 
The culture is highly paternal which is deterrent to business transparency, 
responsibility and accountability.  
In the Indonesian corporate governance practice, the audit 
committee has a majority representation of independent directors from 
either the Direksi or the Dewan Komisaris in the audit committee which 
provides significant strength to the audit process. The mandatory 
requirement of an accounting and finance expert also allows for expert 
opinion regarding audit matters. This is one of the key strengths in the 
Indonesian corporate governance code. 
Both Indonesia and UAE are in their nascent stages of corporate 
governance implementation. Although the history of corporate governance 
code in Indonesia dates back to 2001, the country has been in the bottom 
levels of the ACGA list for excellence in corporate governance. Despite 
this, the country, being a growing and developing nation, has shown 
significant improvements and strength in its mechanism of corporate 
governance since 2006 by staying much above the Global Index in the 
financial markets. This is one representation and it still has a long way to 
go before it becomes a hub for significant economic activity attracting huge 





UAE on the other hand, has attracted huge financial capital in the 
past and has little record of corporate governance practice. It is seen as a 
major investment hub by most businesses. In order to retain the financial 
and investment interest of large multinationals, the country has adopted 
the corporate governance practice in 2007. The culture of the country 
becomes a problem in association with the corporate governance code. 
There is a need for greater awareness regarding the importance of such 
codes for sustaining business in the nation among both the companies as 
well as the shareholders. This can only be brought about by stricter 
implementation of laws and providing higher awareness to all. 
5.2.Recommendation 
In the context of UAE, the country needs high levels of training and 
awareness building in popularizing the concept of corporate governance. 
The paternal nature of the country’s culture is a strong hindrance to 
smooth implementation of corporate governance practices. Also with this, 
the shareholders are relatively weak. The information sharing has been 
limited to the areas that are deemed public. Any knowhow relating to the 
utilization of public money has not been shared with the owners of the 
company. They are treated as mere providers of finance who have voting 
and decision making rights only in paper with little or no information 
regarding the money being spent. Additionally, the use of proxies in the 





supervision of the overseeing committee brings in higher levels of 
manipulation of voting rights. The power of major shareholders who are 
generally of kin can be easily erroneously utilized.  Hence it is 
recommended that the country implements a review of their corporate 
governance codes that are in line with the international standards. Along 
with this there is a need to implement a strict code for compliance either by 
law or by raising awareness of the positive effects of implementation of 
corporate governance codes for besetting competition. 
It is also suggested that UAE corporate governance codes allow for 
certain degree of rights of decision making of the board over the profit 
redistribution percentage so as to instill sufficient strength in corporate 
decision making body. Dilution of interests of board of directors might 
hamper company growth (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013). 
In the context of Indonesia, the impact of strong implementation of 
corporate governance code is evident through its stock market 
performance after the revised code was enacted in 2006. In this context, 
the country has made quite an impression in the world with its financial 
performance and strength in the speed of implementation of the code. 
However, it still does not rank very high with the Asian rankings of 
effectiveness of the levels of corporate governance in Asian nations. The 
country also does not have a proper law in place for non compliance of 





financial manipulations by companies.  Additionally, the country also 
requires to make a rule based implementation of corporate governance 
codes within companies in order to hasten the process of its 
implementation. The lack of speed in ethics based approach also implies 
that there is a general lack of awareness in companies over the benefits of 
corporate governance codes implementations and this call for a higher 
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